I mean, it is a little more detailed than a random bot on X-
President Nicolás Maduro has arrived in New York City to be tried by the U.S. Department of Justice on criminal charges related to drug trafficking and weapons possession. His capture began early Saturday morning with multiple explosions reported in Caracas, Venezuela, including at military installations. It soon became clear that the United States was attacking targets in the city. In the immediate aftermath of the operation, which lasted fewer than 30 minutes, senior Venezuelan officials stated that they did not know the whereabouts of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Ilia Flores, and demanded proof of life. Reportedly, the U.S. Army’s Delta Force and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment carried out the capture mission during what has been labeled Operation Absolute Resolve. Venezuelan officials have said at least 40 people, civilians and military personnel, were killed in the attacks.
President Donald Trump quickly took to Truth Social to announce, “The United States of America has successfully carried out a large scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolas Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the country. This operation was done in conjunction with U.S. Law Enforcement.” For his part, Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained that Maduro “has been arrested by U.S. personnel to stand trial on criminal charges in the United States, and that the kinetic action we saw tonight was deployed to protect and defend those executing the arrest warrant.” Attorney General Pam Bondi characterized the operations as law enforcement conducted by the armed forces.
Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, have been indicted in the Southern District of New York. Nicolas Maduro has been charged with Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy, Cocaine Importation Conspiracy, Possession of Machineguns and Destructive Devices, and Conspiracy to Possess Machineguns and Destructive Devices against the United States. They will soon face the full wrath of American justice on American soil in American courts.
She went on to thank “our brave military who conducted the incredible and highly successful mission to capture these two alleged international narco traffickers.” President Trump has since said the United States is going to “run” Venezuela “until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition.”
The operation follows on the heels of 35 boat strikes that have killed at least 115, which the United States has justified based on self-defense, and a CIA drone strike in late December on a docking facility in Venezuela alleged to have been used by drug cartels. Presumably, the United States likewise justifies, in part, Saturday’s operation on the same basis, self-defense against drug trafficking into the United States.
In this article, we explain several international law issues raised by the operation, some of which have been addressed in greater depth in the Just Security collection of articles on the drug boat strikes and other operations dealing with Venezuela. In particular, Operation Absolute Resolve implicates the prohibition on the use of force against other States (e.g., under the UN Charter), extraterritorial law enforcement, and initiation of an international armed conflict (e.g., under the Geneva Conventions).
The bottom line is, unlike the boat strikes the U.S. military has carried out to date that have occurred in international waters against stateless vessels, this operation, striking Venezuela and abducting its president, is clearly a violation of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. That prohibition is the bedrock rule of the international system that separates the rule of law from anarchy, safeguards small States from their more powerful neighbors, and protects civilians from the devastation of war. The consequences of flouting this rule so brazenly are likely to extend well beyond the case of Maduro’s forcible ouster. Likewise, the initiation of an armed conflict – triggering the application of the law of armed conflict, including all four Geneva Conventions – has meaningful consequences, ranging from the protections now owed to Venezuelan nationals in the United States, to the application of rules governing treatment of Maduro and his wife while in U.S. custody, to accountability for any war crimes committed in the course of the conflict.
An Unlawful Use of Force
The prohibition on the use of force: First and foremost, the U.S. operation striking Venezuela and abducting its president is a clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense against armed attack or with U.N. Security Council authorization, both of which are explained further below. The prohibition is set forth in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which provides, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Both the United States and Venezuela are Parties to the Charter, so the prohibition is undoubtedly binding under treaty law. Moreover, as the United States has long held and the International Court of Justice has noted, the prohibition reflects customary international law, which likewise binds the United States (Paramilitary Activities, ¶ 190).
Any forcible action by one State against another triggers the prohibition. Accordingly, the U.S. operations constituted a prima facie breach unless justified by one of two narrow exceptions: 1) authorization by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; or 2) the inherent right of self-defense provided for in Article 51 of the Charter and customary international law. There being no Security Council authorization, the sole possible legal basis for the operation would be self-defense.
In relevant part, Article 51 provides, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Thus, the legality of the U.S. operation turns on whether Venezuela has engaged in an “armed attack” against the United States (or an armed attack is imminent), triggering the right of self-defense, and, if so, whether the U.S. response was both “necessary and proportionate,” the two conditions for the use of force in self-defense (Paramilitary Activities, paras. 194, 237; Nuclear Weapons, para. 41; Oil Platforms, paras. 43, 73-74, 76). The conditions are relevant only if the first hurdle is crossed. As will be explained, it is clearly not.
No self-defense justification: The Trump administration has repeatedly justified its strikes on boats allegedly carrying drugs (largely involving cocaine, much of which is likely bound for Europe) on the basis of self-defense. For instance, early on, a White House spokesperson claimed they were “conducted against the operations of a designated terrorist organization and was taken in defense of vital U.S. national interests and in the collective self-defense of other nations.” Along these lines, a classified Justice Department memo apparently argues that force may be used against cartels because they pose an “imminent threat to Americans.” For these assertions to make any sense, the drug activity must be characterized as an “armed attack” against the United States. Indeed, in a statement to the UN Security Council in October, the U.S. representative said, “President Trump determined these cartels are non-state armed groups, designated them as terrorist organizations, and determined that their actions constitute an armed attack against the United States.”
It is on this basis that the United States may attempt to assert self-defense against Venezuela. As evidenced by the charges against Maduro both in 2020 and in the new superseding indictment, the administration links him and other government officials to the activities of drug cartels. For instance, in August, the State Department alleged,
Maduro helped manage and ultimately lead the Cartel of the Suns, a Venezuelan drug-trafficking organization comprised of high-ranking Venezuelan officials. As he gained power in Venezuela, Maduro participated in a corrupt and violent narco-terrorism conspiracy with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Maduro negotiated multi-ton shipments of FARC-produced cocaine; directed the Cartel of the Suns to provide military-grade weapons to the FARC; coordinated with narcotics traffickers in Honduras and other countries to facilitate large-scale drug trafficking; and solicited assistance from FARC leadership in training an unsanctioned militia group that functioned, in essence, as an armed forces unit for the Cartel of the Suns.
We have refuted the self-defense argument vis-à-vis the cartels in earlier articles (see, e.g., here and here). Drug trafficking simply does not qualify as, and has never been considered, an “armed attack.” In brief, the relationship between drug trafficking and the deaths that eventually result from drugs being purchased and used in the United States is far too attenuated to qualify as an armed attack. The drugs must be successfully transported into the country, where they are distributed to various drug organizations, and subsequently sold on the streets, in most cases by individuals who are unrelated to the original drug cartels. Willing buyers then purchase them; almost all survive. In fact, those deaths that occur run contrary to the interests of the cartels because they deprive the drug market of customers and risk deterring others from buying the drugs.
It is indisputable that drug trafficking is condemnable criminal activity, but it is not the type of activity that triggers the right of self-defense in international law. It is not a use of force, it is not “hostilities,” and it is not “combat,” despite Trump administration officials using these labels when describing drug trafficking activity.
The connection is even more attenuated in the case of Maduro and other members of the Venezuelan government who may be involved in drug activity. After all, the sole purpose of the cartels is to traffic drugs, whereas, if the allegations are true, the Venezuelan government’s involvement, albeit also condemnable, is less direct. Accordingly, if the self-defense argument does not work for drug cartels, asserting that it applies to Maduro and the Venezuelan government is even less plausible. Simply put, there is no basis for suggesting that any Venezuelan government involvement in drug activity rises to the level of an armed attack against the United States, giving it the right to resort to force against Venezuela to defend itself. This being so, the Operation Absolute Resolve was a clear violation of the international law prohibition on the use of force.
Distinguishing past practice – the Noriega case: Three points should be made about the closest historical example in U.S. practice: the 1989 U.S. operation to capture General Manuel Noriega in Panama and bring him to the United States to face drug smuggling and other charges. First, reaffirming the prohibition against the use of force, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the U.S. operation. The General Assembly stated that it “strongly deplores the intervention in Panama by the armed forces of the United States of America, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.”
Second, the U.S. justifications for the Noriega-Panama operation distinguish it from the Maduro-Venezuela case. Most importantly, in the former case, the United States claimed to be acting by invitation of the rightful Head of State. “It was welcomed by the democratically elected government of Panama,” President George H.W. Bush informed the U.S. Congress in a War Powers Resolution report. Likewise, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering told the U.N. Security Council, “United States action in Panama has been approved, applauded and welcomed by the democratically elected Government of Panama.”
Third, as noted by President George H.W. Bush, the United States acted after the Panamanian National Assembly declared a state of war against the United States, and after forces under Noriega’s command “killed an unarmed American serviceman; wounded another; arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman; and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse.” Bush added that “General Noriega’s reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama.” Secretary of State James A. Baker also stated, “We received an intelligence report that General Noriega was considering launching an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential neighborhood.” None of those factors is present here.
Venezuela may use necessary and proportionate force in self-defense: Finally, based on the U.S. position that all wrongful uses of force are armed attacks, Venezuela has the right to use necessary and proportionate force against the United States’ armed attack to defend itself (DoD, Law of War Manual, §1.11.5.2; but see Paramilitary Activities, ¶ 191). Additionally, as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter, Venezuela may seek the assistance of other States acting in collective self-defense.
Intervention into Venezuela’s Internal Affairs: Finally, we note that in addition to a violation of the use of force prohibition, the U.S. action to remove Maduro as Head of State amounts to an unlawful intervention into Venezuela’s internal affairs (“choice of political system,” Paramilitary Activities, ¶ 205). Regime change by one State in another amounts to intervention when it is “coercive” (¶ 206), which Saturday’s operation obviously was.
Extraterritorial Law Enforcement
The administration has framed the operation on Saturday and the seizure of Maduro and his wife in the context of law enforcement. The key international law issue in the case is the extraterritorial exercise of “enforcement jurisdiction,” specifically, the power to arrest. (One of us, Ryan, has explained why the administration’s reliance on a 1989 DOJ Office of Legal Counsel memo erroneously concluding that the president may, as a domestic law matter, “override” art. 2(4) of the UN Charter is flawed.).
No enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of other States without their consent: There are three types of jurisdiction under international law: prescriptive (legislative), adjudicative (judicial), and enforcement (executive). International law allows a degree of prescriptive jurisdiction (the power to pass laws) over offences committed abroad, as perhaps alleged here. However, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction is strictly limited to a State’s own territory (or in limited cases, in the commons, as in the case of jurisdiction aboard a flag state vessel). But on another State’s territory, the consent of that State is required (S.S. Lotus, PCIJ, page 18; Restatement Third of Foreign Relations, § 432). Without it, the action violates the territorial State’s sovereignty on two grounds. First, it is a violation of that State’s territorial sovereignty; this has clearly occurred. Second, it is an “usurpation” of an “inherently governmental function” by another State. In other words, the United States has engaged in governmental activity in Venezuela – law enforcement – that is exclusively the domain of the Venezuelan government.
A leading precedent involves the U.N. response to an extraterritorial law enforcement operation: the forcible apprehension of Nazi fugitive Adolph Eichmann in Argentina by Israeli agents in May 1960, and bringing him to trial in Israel for war crimes. With support from the United States, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution stating:
Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations …
Noting that the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach of the principles upon which international order is founded, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the preservation of peace …
Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law.
In 1989, the State Department’s legal adviser, Abe Sofaer, stated in written congressional testimony, “The United States has repeatedly associated itself with the view that unconsented arrests violate the principle of territorial integrity.” He added, “Arrests in foreign States without their consent have no legal justification under international law aside from self-defense.”
The United States claims, rightfully so, that Maduro’s presidency is not “legitimate.” However, that has no bearing on this situation. Even though the United States does not recognize the Maduro government as legitimate, international law provides that the relevant officials to grant consent are those of the government that exercises “effective control” over the territory, in this case, officials in the Maduro administration (Tinoco Arbitration, pages 381-82). Obviously, no such consent has been granted.
Head of state immunity and inviolability: Moreover, Maduro enjoyed immunity (known as “immunity ratione personae”) from foreign enforcement jurisdiction under customary international law. As noted by the International Court of Justice in its Arrest Warrant judgement, “it is firmly established that … certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal” (¶ 51; see also Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance, ¶¶ 170-174).
Relatedly, the United States has observed that “in addition to immunity from criminal jurisdiction, heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers who enjoy personal immunity also benefit from personal inviolability, a protection that informs their treatment in the criminal context.” Such inviolability includes protection from arrest by other States while in office. ( Comments from the United States on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Criminal Immunity).
While in office, this immunity and inviolability is absolute and bars any form of enforcement jurisdiction by another State. The purpose of the immunity, as noted by the Court, is to “ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States” (¶ 53). It is a manifestation of the Principle of “sovereign equality” in international law (UN Charter, art. 2(1)). Where some might argue that an exception exists for Heads of State who commit serious war crimes and other atrocities, that is not relevant to the U.S. case against Maduro.
The Trump administration may argue that Maduro was not, in fact, the Head of State, given that his most recent re-election was neither free nor fair (we agree with that as a factual matter), and that the United States does not recognize his government. Similarly, following the Saturday swearing-in as interim President of Delcy Rodriguez, the United States may argue that he is no longer Head of State, even if he was previously so. Both arguments fail. First, withdrawing recognition of a government does not remove the personal immunity that the incumbent head of state enjoys under customary international law. Second, Rodriguez has said (post swearing in) that Maduro is “the only President of Venezuela,” and is calling for the release of Maduro and his wife.
Unlawful use of lethal force: Even if international law permitted the United States to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in Venezuela, which it does not, the use of lethal force to do so was self-evidently unlawful. During law enforcement operations, resort to deadly force is lawful only when necessary in the face of an immediate threat of death or grievous bodily injury to the law enforcement officials or others (Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; see also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 36, para 12).
Secretary Rubio claims that the kinetic operations mounted by the U.S. armed forces were necessary to protect those taking custody of Maduro, presumably by preventing the Venezuelan armed forces from responding. However, the threat must be immediate and strictly necessary. The strikes were, instead, primarily preventive and anticipatory in character; they fall far outside the scope of permissible lethal measures during a law enforcement operation. If at least 40 people were killed, including civilians, that would be strong evidence that Rubio’s asserted justification is without legal merit.
Moreover, it should be self-evident that “unit self-defense” (i.e., defense of a contingent of armed forces in a foreign country, as opposed to self-defense of the United States as a nation) cannot be the lawful basis for the use of force when any potential need for unit self-defense is only itself created in the first instance by the insertion of the U.S. forces.
Recovery of Unlawfully Expropriated Oil Assets
We also note that Trump has claimed that Venezuela has “stolen” U.S. oil and assets and demanded their return. In 2007, Venezuela, under President Hugo Chavez, converted existing oil extraction contracts into State-controlled joint ventures. When some major foreign oil companies rejected these terms, their assets were expropriated without the required prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Although Venezuela had previously nationalized the oil industry in 1976, these 2007 actions targeted foreign investors specifically and amounted to unlawful expropriations under international law. Trump is now offering to help American oil companies recover their wrongfully seized assets, reportedly contingent on compliance with U.S. policy priorities, although the nature and legality of these conditions remain unclear.
However, one thing is clear from the outset: using force to acquire those assets is unlawful, as the action does not qualify as self-defense, no matter how unlawful the expropriation may have been. And even if it did, the forcible U.S. action does not comport with the necessity condition for self-defense because there are non-forcible avenues that could be pursued. Examples include retorsion, arbitration, and countermeasures under the law of State responsibility (Articles on State Responsibility, art. 22). Simply put, the United States may not simply seize back the assets by force.
We do not address here the potential violation, if not war crime, of the law of armed conflict for pillaging another State’s natural resources. Readers may wish to consult James Stewart’s prior analysis in a 2016 essay at Just Security.
Armed Conflict
Putting aside the issue of whether the U.S. operation violated international law, which it undoubtedly did, it also initiated an “international armed conflict” between the United States and Venezuela. This is so regardless of how the United States might characterize the operations. Under Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the existence of an international armed conflict is a question of fact. In other words, if there are hostilities between the States, there is an international armed conflict even if one of them does not formally recognize its existence. Common Article 2 is universally accepted as reflective of customary international law.
There are numerous challenging issues regarding the classification of conflicts, such as the precise threshold at which they are triggered and whether another State’s support of a non-State organized armed group that is engaged in hostilities with a State suffices to initiate an armed conflict between the two States. Those thornier issues are not relevant to these strikes and the Maduro capture operation. The intensity of the U.S. operations directed at Venezuela clearly crossed any conceivable threshold necessary to trigger an international armed conflict. To be clear, the operations put the United States and Venezuela in armed conflict as a matter of fact and of law.
(Note: If the United States began “running the country,” as President Trump suggested, an enduring international armed conflict may exist. That’s because a military occupation of another country, even if it meets with no armed resistance, is classified as an “international armed conflict.” More on the law of occupation is below.)
The consequences are profound. To begin with, the law of armed conflict, including all four of the Geneva Conventions, now applies. Of particular note, the rules for targeting permit Venezuelan forces to attack U.S. forces anywhere in Venezuelan or U.S. territory, and on the high seas, in international airspace, or in outer space (so-called “status-based targeting”). The law of armed conflict also prohibits targeting civilians and civilian objects (DoD Law of War Manual (§ 5.5). This is especially relevant to the issue of whether operations may now be directed at drug-related targets in Venezuela.
Targeting individuals involved in drug trafficking: Individuals involved in drug activities do not qualify as lawful targets unless they are members of the armed forces or “directly participating in the hostilities.” As explained in the DoD Law of War Manual (§ 5.8.3): “At a minimum, taking a direct part in hostilities includes actions that are, by their nature and purpose, intended to cause actual harm to the enemy.”
As is apparent, drug-related activities do not satisfy this standard (see our fuller explanation here). Accordingly, attacking those involved in such activities in the context of this armed conflict would violate the law of armed conflict prohibition and constitute a war crime, so long as those civilians do not separately participate in the armed hostilities (in the absence of an armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela, those killings constituted murder, and extrajudicial killings under international human rights law, but were not war crimes because that body of law clearly did not apply). More difficult questions arise as to whether an attack on non-state actors ferrying drugs on the high seas would be related enough to the war between the United States and Venezuela (an armed conflict “nexus” requirement) to be governed by the law of armed conflict, and thus constitute a war crime.
Targeting drug-related assets and facilities: Whether drug-related assets and facilities may be attacked depends on whether the U.S. position on so-called war-sustaining (or revenue-generating) targets is correct and the factual extent to which Venezuela relies on drug proceeds to fund its war effort. The same is true of its oil production and exports.
A war-sustaining entity “indirectly, but effectively supports and sustains the belligerents’ warfighting capability,” such as “exports of products the proceeds of which are used by the belligerent to purchase arms and armaments” (Commander’s Handbook, § 7.4). The prevailing view in international law is that war-sustaining objects do not qualify as targetable military objectives. However, the United States has, for decades, claimed that war-sustaining objects are legitimate military objectives. It is a position with which one of us agrees, but the others do not (DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.6.8).
To the extent neutrality law survives the U.N. Charter era (a much-debated question), it also now applies. Since the United States is the aggressor in this situation, under the “qualified neutrality” interpretation of neutrality law asserted by the United States, all States would be prohibited from providing it any assistance. Yet, they could come to Venezuela’s assistance without violating their neutrality law obligations.
The law of occupation would apply if the United States exercises “effective control”: In light of President Trump’s claim that “we are going to run the country now,” the law of occupation outlined in the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) will apply if the United States exerts “effective control” of Venezuela. For now, it seems unlikely, based on the current facts (no U.S. troops on the ground, the swearing in of Vice President Rodriguez as interim President), that this situation will develop. Thus, while Trump has essentially used the rhetoric of occupation through coercion of proxy officials, the United States has not attempted to control territory itself, nor is it at all clear that officials who do exercise governmental authority will act as directed by the United States.
Prisoner of war and “protected person” status under the Geneva Conventions: As a civilian captured by attacking forces in an international armed conflict, Maduro’s wife is entitled to a robust set of protections afforded to captured civilians in GCIV. Indeed, Flores qualifies as a “protected person,” as defined in art. 4(1) of that treaty:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Arguably, Maduro also qualifies as a protected person. Given his status as commander-in-chief of Venezuela’s armed forces, he might also be considered a prisoner of war entitled to the extensive protections of the Third Geneva Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of War (GCIII). In the 1992 case of U.S. v. Noriega, a federal district court found that General Noriega was “entitled to the full range of rights under the [POW] treaty, which has been incorporated into U.S. law.” However, in that case, which involved Noriega’s seizure by U.S. forces during the 1989 invasion of Panama, the general was the military dictator of Panama and also commanded the Panama Defense Forces.
A suite of protections also kicks in for other civilians who are nationals of one party to the conflict and find themselves in the hands of the adverse State. Accordingly, Venezuelans in the United States are now “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention, as are Americans inside Venezuela. This has far-ranging implications for U.S. immigration and related policies. For example, Venezuelans who are protected persons have rights including protection against “brutality” (GC IV art. 32), against collective punishment and reprisals (GC IV art. 33); parity of employment opportunities (GC IV art. 39), rules for return of detainees transferred to a third State as in CECOT/El Salvador (GC IV art. 45), and family unity in detention (GC IV art. 82).
Concluding Thoughts
The operation against Venezuela, which culminated in the capture of President Maduro and his wife, amounts to a severe breach of foundational principles of international law. It constitutes a clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The claim that drug trafficking, or State involvement in such trafficking, constitutes an “armed attack” sufficient to justify a forcible response in self-defense has no support in customary international law or State practice.
Nor can the exercise of extraterritorial enforcement of domestic criminal law, even against narco- traffickers or indicted heads of State, be justified in the absence of Venezuela’s consent. By exercising enforcement jurisdiction there, the United States has violated Venezuelan sovereignty both because the operation occurred on its territory and because it has usurped an inherently governmental function (law enforcement) exclusively enjoyed by Venezuela. Moreover, despite any crimes he may have committed, Maduro’s seizure violates the long-standing rule of immunity ratione personae for heads of State.
In addition to violating bedrock jus ad bellum rules governing the resort to force and the sovereignty of Venezuela, the operation has triggered an international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela. The legal consequences are immediate and sweeping – the whole body of the law of armed conflict now applies, including the law governing detention, the conduct of hostilities, protected persons, and war crimes.
The U.S. operation has long-term implications for the integrity of the international legal order, including the systems put in place to prevent war and protect States from using their criminal enforcement powers to intrude on other countries’ sovereign prerogatives.
About the Authors
Michael Schmitt
Michael Schmitt (Bluesky - LinkedIn) is Professor of International Law at the University of Reading, Affiliate at Harvard Law School’s Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, and Visiting Research Professor at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.
Ryan Goodman
Ryan Goodman (X - Bluesky - LinkedIn) is co-editor-in-chief of Just Security and Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.
Tess Bridgeman
Tess Bridgeman (Bluesky - LinkedIn) is co-editor-in-chief of Just Security and Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the Reiss Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law. She previously served as Special Assistant to the President, Associate Counsel to the President, and Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC) in the Obama Administration, and at the U.S. State Department in the Office of the Legal Adviser.
https://www.justsecurity.org/127981/international-law-venezuela-maduro/
